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CHAPTER 3 
Torts 
WILLIAM J. CURRAN 
§3.1. Misrepresentation: Reasonable reliance and mistake. The 
rule of caveat emptor, a relic of the David Harum era in America, is 
slowly being read out of Massachusetts law. The now famous case 
of Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp.1 did much to require 
greater common honesty in "seller's talk" in the bargaining stages. 
Now, with the case of Yorke v. Taylor2 decided during the 1955 SUR-
VEY year, the Court purports to adopt the rule that the seller cannot 
use the defense of a lack of reasonable investigation by the buyer to 
resist an action based on the seller's misrepresentation of material 
facts. 
The cautious wording of "purports to adopt" is used above due to 
the fact that the Yorke decision is a suit for rescission, not a tort action. 
The plaintiff brought his rescission action on the grounds of "fraud 
and misrepresentation." 3 In the negotiations for a sale of real estate 
the defendant seller had asserted that the assessed valuation of his 
property had not been increased from 1952 to 1953, even though he 
had made extensive capital improvements. The buyer later discov-
ered that the assessment had been increased from $12,500 to $26,-
000. 
The trial court found that the defendants did not know that the 
assessment had been raised, that they had acted in good faith and 
with no intent to mislead or deceive the plaintiff. The lower court 
also found that the plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the defend-
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ants' statement since the assessed value was "a matter of public in-
formation equally within the reach of the plaintiff and defendants." 4 
The trial court dismissed the bill. 
The Supreme Judicial Court treated the two findings above sepa-
rately. First, on the issue of the defendants' liability for the state-
ment made, the Court found that since the statement of fact was made 
"of one's own knowledge," it was sufficient as grounds for rescission. 
On the facts, this is not a startling result, since mistake of a material 
fact has always been grounds for rescission.5 However, the "of one's 
own knowledge" rule has been generally recognized as the minority 
tort law rule in this country for imposing strict liability for misrepre-
sentation.6 The leading case for this rule is the Massachusetts deci-
sion of Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffat7 decided in 1888. For its 
holding in the instant case the Supreme Judicial Court cites Chatham 
and three rescission cases8 in that order. It would seem rescission 
cases in Massachusetts are governed by the tort law of misrepresenta-
tion when the plaintiff's claim is based on fraud.9 
It is, of course, on the second finding of the lower court that the 
Yorke v. Taylor case gains its importance. Again, however, the Court 
somewhat beclouds its significance by using language applicable to 
tort law, but applying it to a rescission suit. 
In reaching this issue, the Court admitted the existence of a long 
line of Massachusetts decisions supporting the reasoning of the lower 
court that the plaintiff-buyer must use "due care and diligence in pro-
tecting his rights." 10 Justice Spalding replied to this, however, "But 
the trend of modern authority is opposed to this philosophy. Restate-
ment: Torts, §540. Prosser on Torts, §88. Harper on Torts, 
§224 ... " 11 The Court then cited authorities in other jurisdic-
tions and an impressive line of its own decisions which has grown up 
seemingly independent of the contrary line of cases and culminating 
4 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 260, 124 N.E.2d at 915. The lower court did not spe-
cifically find that the plaintiff was unreasonable in relying on defendant's statement, 
but the Supreme Judicial Court treats the quoted language from the findings as 
necessarily implying that this conclusion was found. 
52 Restatement of Contracts §§470(1), 476; Restatement of Restitution §28(b); 
5 Williston, Contracts §1500 (rev. ed. 1937). 
6 Prosser, Torts 547 (2d ed. 1955); Morris, Torts 260 (1953). In accord with Massa-
chusetts on this rule, see Gagne v. Bertran Drilling Co., 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 
(1954); Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A.2d 358 (1954); National Bank of 
Pawnee v. Hamilton, 202 Ill. App. 516 (1916); Braley v. Powers, 92 Me. 203, 42 Atl. 
362 (1898); Peterson v. Schaberg, 1I6 Neb. 346,217 N.W. 586 (1928); Ultramares Corp. 
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 44, 74 A.L.R. 1I39 (1931). 
7147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888). See particularly discussion in Morris, Torts 
260 et seq. (1953). 
8 Bates v. Cashman, 230 Mass. 167, 1I9 N.E. 663 (1918); Rudnick v. Rudnick, 281 
Mass. 205, 183 N.E. 348 (1932); Enterprises, Inc. v. Cardinale, 331 Mass. 244, 1I8 
N.E.2d 740 (1954). 
9 Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass. 362, 364, 25 N.E.2d 740, 742 (1940). 
101955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 260, 124 N.E.2d 912, 915. 
11 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 260-261, 124 N.E.2d at 915. 
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in a citation to the famous Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building 
Corp.12 The Court concluded: 
But whatever our rule has been formerly on the subject of dili-
gence - and it is not easy to reconcile all that has been said-
we prefer the rule of the Restatement that "The recipient in a 
business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is 
justified in relying on its truth, although he might have ascer-
tained the falsity of the representation had he made an investiga-
tion." 13 
The above would certainly seem to indicate that the Court intends 
to repudiate its former holdings in tort cases as well as rescission suits. 
The strength of the Court's conviction to discard the diligence re-
quirement is indicated in the instant case involving public records, 
one of the most readily used - and most legally recognized - sources 
of information.14 
There was a final point in the case which had to be treated: putting 
the two findings together. Here the Court ran into the objection that 
the Restatement rule applies, by its very language, only to an inten-
tional misrepresentation. The Court had not disagreed with the 
lower court's finding that the misrepresentation here was innocent. 
However, Justice Spalding alluded again to the "as of one's own 
knowledge" rule: 
In this Commonwealth, where the rule is stricter than in some 
other jurisdictions, a false though innocent representation of a 
fact made as of one's own knowledge may be the basis of liability. 
The same legal consequences attach to this type of representation 
as to one that is deliberately and consciously false. On principle, 
lack of diligence on the part of the victim ought not to have any 
better standing as a defense to rescission in the one case than in 
the other, and we are not disposed to treat these situations differ-
ently.15 
The language quoted above leaves unresolved whether or not the 
same rule would be applied in a tort case. However, since the "of 
one's own knowledge" rule is misrepresentation in this state, we may, 
perhaps, draw the cautious conclusion that the Court may be inclined 
to apply these same principles on the law side when the occasion 
arises. 
12 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692 (1952). 
131955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 261. 124 N.E.2d at 916. 
14 There are decisions from other jurisdictions in accord with this view in regard 
to public records. 3 Restatement of Torts §540, Comment b; Pattridge v. Youmans, 
107 Colo. 122, 109 P.2d 646 (1941); Coules' Executor v. Johnson, 297 Ky. 454, 179 
S.W.2d 674 (1944); Linch v. Carlson, 156 Neb. 308, 56 N.W.2d 101 (1952); Campanelli 
v. Vescera, 75 R.I. 71, 63 A.2d 722 (1949). 
151955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 262, 124 N.E.2d at 916. 
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§3.2. Libel and politics: Defamatory meaning. One of the most 
difficult, and certainly one of the most illogical, of the categories of 
civil actions grouped under the title of torts is defamation. The con-
trolling primary issue in this tort is one of semantics, i.e., are the words 
/ complained of reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning? If this 
question is answered in the affirmative the next question is whether 
the words were understood in the defamatory sense in this particular 
instance. As in so many problems of tort law. an important aspect of 
these issues is who decides them, judge or jury. The general rule in 
'this country is that the first issue above is for the court,l while the 
second is for the jury.2 It is also the rule, in Massachusetts as else-
where,s that if the court finds a statement reasonably capable of vari-
ous meanings, some defamatory and some not, it is for the jury to de-
cide which way the words were actually understood. 
A significant case was decided in Massachusetts during the 1955 
SURVEY year which raises problems in this area. In Ricci v. Crowley4 
the plaintiff was a member of the Everett Board of Appeals. He held 
this position on appointment by the mayor for a five-year term ending 
in March, 1955. In December, 1954, the incumbent mayor, the 
defendant, removed the plaintiff from his position. The plaintiff sued 
the mayor for libel alleging that the defendant "falsely and mali-
ciously wrote and published of the plaintiff" in letters to the city clerk, 
the auditor, and the treasurer that the plaintiff was removed as a 
member of the Board of Appeals "for the good of the service." 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court's action in 
sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. For the Court, Justice 
Counihan asserted: 
The words "for the good of the service" have come to have an ac-
cepted meaning and are not infrequently used by executives in all 
branches of the government service when the occasion arises for 
the removal of an appointive officer. They are not defamatory. 
"This is the same language employed in the notice of removal 
considered in Ayers v. Hatch, 175 Mass. 489, a case concerning 
the removal by the mayor of a member of the board of assessors 
of the same city. The court there said [page 492]: ' ... the 
cause assigned was "the good of the service," and manifestly it 
seems to us, that was good ground for removal. The natural in-
ference would be that in some respects the petitioner had failed to 
§3.2. 1 Restatement of Torts §614(1); Prosser. Torts 581 (2d ed. 1955); Patterson 
v. Evans. 254 Mo. 293. 162 S.W. 179 (1914); Reiman v. Pacific Development Co .• 132 
Ore. 82. 284 Pac. 575 (1930); Morrissette v. Beatte. 66 R.I. 73. 17 A.2d 464 (1941); 
Smith v. Smith. 194 S.C. 247. 98 S.E.2d 584 (1940). 
23 Restatement of Torts §614(2); Prosser. Torts 581 (2d ed. 1955); Linehan v. 
Nelson. 194 N.Y. 482. 90 N.E. 1114. 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1119 (1910); Nettles v. Mac-
Millan Petroleum Corp .• 210 S.C. 200. 42 S.E.2d 57 (1947). 
S Prosser. Torts 581 (2d ed. 1955); Twombly v. Monroe. 136 Mass. 464 (1884). 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 765. 127 N.E.2d 652. 
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perform his duties or was incompetent or inefficient, or was an 
unsuitable person for the position to which he was appointed.''' 
... The defendant as mayor [in Ricci v. Crowley] may well 
have determined for many reasons, none of which reflected upon 
the character or probity of the plaintiff, that another, perhaps 
more qualified, could do a better job for the city. Nothing de-
famatory may be inferred from the use of such words.1! 
This finding of the Court raises some puzzling queries. Though 
the Court finds that the words cannot be defamatory, they admit that 
the "natural inference" from them is that the person removed has 
"failed to perform his duties or was incompetent or inefficient, or was 
a.n unsuitable person for the position . .." Can this inference not 
convey a defamatory meaning, i.e., discredit the plaintiff in the minds 
of any considerable and respectable class in the community? 
Though not discussed by the Court or in the briefs of the parties, 
the phrase "for the good of the service" is perhaps best known in its 
military connotations. In U.S. Army Regulations6 the phrase is used 
in regard to resignations classified as "undesirable discharges." The 
primary grounds for use of this separation technique are stated as fol-
lows in the Army Judge Advocate General School Manual: "An in-
dividual whose conduct has rendered him triable by court-martial for 
an offense punishable by dishonorable or bad conduct discharge may 
tender his resignation for the good of the service in lieu of trial by 
court-martial." 1 
Is the possibility of an unfavorable inference being drawn in the 
instant case weakened at all by the fact that the plaintiff might have 
been removed because "another, perhaps more qualified, could do a 
better job for the city"? This merely presents us with a case where a 
statement could be taken two ways, one defamatory, the other not. 
Was it not for the jury to decide which way it was actually taken in 
the community? And also, was it not a major point of inquiry to dis-
cover just what are the allowable grounds for dismissal of members of 
the board of appeals appointed for five-year terms? 8 
An interesting contrast may be drawn between the instant case and 
a recent English decision. In Morris v. Sandess Universal Products9 
the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as a salesman. 
I! 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 766·767, 127 N.E.2d at 653. 
6 AR 605·275 (1952); AR 615·367 (1953). 
11953 Special Text, J.A.G. School of Military Affairs Manual, c. 8, §8. 
8 Neither the plaintiff's declaration nor the appellate brief indicates the grounds 
for removal. However, the plaintiff brought a separate action of mandamus for 
reinstatement and alleged that he could be removed only for "cause." The Supreme 
Judicial Court in a per curiam decision affirmed a denial of the writ on the grounds 
that there was nothing in the record to show that the city of Everett ever adopted 
a zoning ordinance under G.L., c. 40A, §14, and the Court does not take judicial 
notice of municipal legislation. See Ricci v. Mayor of Everett, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sb. 
871, 127 N.E.2d 669. 
9 [1954] I Weekly L.R. 67, [1954] I All E.R. 47. 
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After termination of his employment the defendant sent a circular 
letter to some of its customers informing them that "we have dis-
missed Mr. Morris from our employ." Plaintiff sued for libel asserting 
that the statement was meant and was understood as meaning that the 
plaintiff was dismissed against his will under circumstances of discredit 
to the plaintiff. 
The English court decided that the declaration presented an issue 
for the jury, asserting: 
Counsel for the defendants has suggested to us a variety of 
meanings for the word "dismissed," and he says that it does not, 
by any means, necessarily have a derogatory connotation. But, 
in my view, the function of the judge on such a matter is to 
endeavour to decide what meaning the language used could rea-
sonably be held to convey to the persons to whom the communica-
tion was address.ed. Looking at this letter from that point of 
view, notwithstanding the various inoffensive meanings which the 
words: "We have dismissed [the first, or second, plaintiffJ," 
might be said to be capable of bearing, I find myself unable to 
hold that the words complained of are not capable of a defama-
tory meaning, or that it is not possible that a reasonable jury 
might hold them to be defamatory. With the question whether 
or not they are defamatory, this court at this stage has nothing 
whatever to do. That will be a question for the jury when the 
case comes to be tried. to 
The instant decision of the Massachusetts Court may seem, then, 
difficult to reconcile with its previous holding in the well-known case 
of Fahy v. Melrose Free Press: "In this Commonwealth the rule has 
been stated repeatedly that 'it is only when the court can say that the 
publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning, and 
cannot reasonably be understood in any defamatory sense that the 
court can rule as a matter of law that the publication is not li-
belous.' " 11 
However, the position taken by the Court in the Ricci case may be 
defended in various ways. Coming back to the actual words used, 
they can be viewed in an entirely different light than the semantic 
question of defamatory meaning. The phrase "for the good of the 
service" is very often used in government circles for the very purpose 
of avoiding unnecessary defamation of the person involved - as might 
be the result of a more plenary statement of the reasons for the dis-
missal. 
In addition, of course, the entire case is colored by an issue of 
privilege. At least a qualified privilege (in good faith and without 
10 [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. at 73, [1954] 1 All E.R. at 51. 
11298 Mass. 267, 268-269, 10 N.E.2d 187, 188 (1937). 
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malice) would seem to be available to the defendant as a defense.12 
If a communication such as this does involve privilege, the mayor 
could have gone further in asserting express derogatory grounds for 
removal and still would have been shielded from a libel suit. Instead, 
he gave the ambivalent reason of "for the good of the service." 
This decision may encourage the more restrained type of removal 
technique, thus accomplishing a bit of practical prophylactic treat-
ment in everyday political life. 
It is interesting to note that of the four important defamation cases 
coming before the Supreme Judicial Court in recent years involving 
political or governmental figures, three have been dismissed ~demur­
rer on the primary grounds of a lack of defamatory meanin~Joined 
with the defenses of privilege because of governmental activity and 
the privilege of fair comment, the Court would seem to be building 
another formidable obstacle in the path of plaintiffs in this area. 
§3.3. Assumption of the risk in places of amusement. During the 
1955 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court added another signifi-
cant case to the growing body of Massachusetts law on assumption of 
the risk in places of amusement. 
In Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc.1 the plaintiff and his wife were 
attending the "stock car races" at the defendant's outdoor arena. 
During one of the races, a wheel broke loose from one of the racing 
cars and flew over the fence in front of the grandstand at a height of 
fifty feet and landed in the box seats striking the plaintiff's wife on 
the head and neck. She died two days later. 
The defense was, of course, assumption of the risk. It was claimed 
that the risk of being hit by a flying wheel was inherent in the sport of 
automobile racing and obvious to a person of ordinary intelligence. 
On this issue it was submitted that the plaintiff had been to the Nor-
wood track about fifteen times in its two years of operation and his 
wife had accompanied him on three or four occasions. Both had ob-
served accidents from collisions, though neither had ever seen a wheel 
fly off a racer into the crowd. The arena supervisor testified that he 
had never seen a wheel go into the box seats in the three years he had 
worked for the defendant but he had seen wheels fly off racers and 
hit the fences or guard rails (on twelve to fifteen different occasions). 
On two occasions he had seen them go over the bleachers and com-
12 On the municipal level, there are few decisions, even nationally, to indicate 
strong authority on this point. However, the leading text writers are in agreement 
that at least a qualified privilege is available. Prosser, Torts 612 (2d ed. 1955); 
Restatement of Torts §§591, 599; Smith v. Higgins, 16 Gray 251 (Mass. 1860); Bradley 
v. Heath, 12 Pi~k. 163 (Mass. 1831). 
13 Dismissed:lPoland v. Post Publishing Co., 330 Mass. 701. 116 N.E.2d 860 (1953); 
Tobin v. Boston Herald·Traveler Corp .• 324 Mass. 478. 87 N.E.2d 116 (1949). De-
murrer overruled: Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304, 125 N.E.2d 137 
(1955). 
§3.3. 1332 Mass. 267, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 137, 124 N.E.2d 505. 
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pletely out of the park, and "that he saw some go into the crowd." 2 It 
was admitted, however, that no warning concerning the danger of 
flying wheels was given to patrons of the arena. 
In submitting the above evidence, the defendants were relying on 
Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co.,s where the Court had 
held assumption of the risk applied where a spectator at a Red Sox 
game (and in a box seat) was hit by a foul ball. The Court had 
stressed in that case the fact that a person familiar with the sport of 
baseball must be aware of the inherent danger and must be taken to 
assume it. To the same effect was Katz v. GOW,4 where it was held a 
patron at a driving range assumes the risk of being hit by a golf ball. 
On the other side of the issue, the plaintiffs were arguing for the 
application of Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp.,5 
where assumption of the risk was not applied when the plaintiff was 
struck by a flying puck at a Bruins' hockey game. There the Court 
stressed the fact that this was the female plaintiff's first time at a 
hockey game and she was unfamiliar with the sport. 
In the instant case, the defendant attempted to distinguish the 
Shanney case on the grounds that the plaintiff and his wife were fa-
miliar with the sport and the risks "inherent" in it. 
The Court refused to go along with the argument of the defendant, 
however, and found that the risk was not assumed. The Court held 
that, even though the plaintiff and his wife were familiar with the 
sport, they had never seen a wheel fly off during a race. The Court 
rejected the defendant's contention that this hazard was one which 
was so open and obvious that, as a matter 'of law, the patrons of the 
track must have assumed it. In fact, the Court asserted the evidence 
"shows that the flying off of a wheel is a somewhat infrequent oc-
currence." 6 
§3.4. Negligence in injuries to patrons in places of amusement. 
In the above discussed Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc.1 the holding 
that the risk was not assumed was not, in the words of the Court, "an 
end of the matter." 2 The Court still had the question of the plaintiff's 
case of primary negligence by the proprietor as warranting the verdict 
for the plaintiff. 
The Court asserted that the proprietor was "not an insurer, and 
to recover the plaintiffs must show some breach of duty on the part of 
the defendant." S The Court pointed out that the plaintiff did not 
contend that greater precautions should have been taken by way of 
2 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 139, 124 N.E.2d at 507. 
S 325 Mass. 419, 90 N.E.2d 840 (1950). 
4321 Mass. 666, 75 N.E.2d 438 (1947). 
5296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936). 
is 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 137, 140, 124 N.E.2d 505. 507. 
§3.4. 1332 Mass. 267, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 137, 124 N.E.2d 505. 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 140, 124 N.E.2d at 508. 
S Ibid. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1955 [1955], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1955/iss1/7
§3.4 TORTS 43 
screens, fences, or guard rails. It should be recalled that the wheel 
had gone over the fence in front of the boxes at a height of fifty feet. 
The Court found, however, that the breach of duty warranting the 
jury finding of negligence was the failure to warn patrons of the dan· 
ger of being hit with a flying wheel, and the jury could find that it 
happened frequently enough to demand a warning. 
Earlier in the opinion the Court stated the general standard of care 
owed by a proprietor of a place of amusement as "the duty to use due 
care to see that his premises are reasonably safe for the intended use 
or to warn them of dangers which are not obvious." 4 This would 
seem to have been taken from the Shanney case.5 However, in the 
latter, the Court held the jury's finding of negligence was warranted 
without indicating whether the finding was supported by the defend-
ant's failure to have a higher guard rail at the sides of the hockey 
rink, or because of a failure to warn, or both. In the instant case we 
have the Court specifically identifying the issue-that the failure to 
warn is alone sufficient grounds for recovery. 
In the past the quoted general standard of care has been taken by 
many to mean that the proprietor is obliged to warn of non-obvious 
defects only where he does not furnish reasonably safe premises. This 
may seem a justifiable construction, since the statement above is in 
the disjunctive. However, in the instant case the Court may have 
intended to avoid the application of this general standard entirely. It 
should be noted that the Justices did not allude to it in their actual 
finding of liability. They discussed only "the breach of a duty" to 
warn. The breach of duty concept as a means of describing tort 
liability for negligence is by no means uncommon.6 Except in rare 
cases of pure nonfeasance, however, it seems to this writer to present 
many problems in actual application.7 
In the instant A lden case the avoidance of the general standard as 
expressed in the Shanney case may be justified on the grounds that it 
is practicable in application only for cases where the plaintiff is mak-
ing a claim based on defects in the premises such as structural defects, 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 139, 124 N.E.2d at 507. 
5296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d I (1936). 
6 Green, Judge and Jury 53 et seq. (1930); Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 
34 Colum. L. Rev. 41 (1934); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 
52 Harv. L. Rev. 372 (1939). For an example of adherence to a "duty" method of 
classifying all negligence cases, see the chapter on Torts, 1954 Survey of Florida Law, 
8 Miami L.Q. 481 et seq. (1954). 
7 Prosser, Torts 165 et seq. (2d ed. 1955). Prosser does not adopt the duty-breach 
test for all cases. Though he adopted it to state the "elements" of the action (p. 165), 
he says at page 166 "It is better to reserve 'duty' for the problem of the relation 
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of 
the other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what 
is required to meet the obligation." 
It should also be noted that the author reverses the order of the chapters on Duty 
and Standard of Conduct from that in his first edition, placing Standard of Conduct 
first in his second edi tion. 
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defects in movable furniture, slipping on foreign substances, and the 
like. Here, the plaintiff was injured due to an active force in being, a 
flying wheel from one of the racers. The problem is, who is responsi-
ble for this? In the Shanney case, the Court said that the hockey 
players were not employees of the proprietor and he was not responsi-
ble for their negligence. Were the racing car drivers, the automobile 
mechanics or other persons who might have actually been negligent 
the employees of the arena proprietor? Is the proprietor responsible 
for their actions? 
In the A lden case the Court does not discuss these problems. It 
solves the dilemma by finding liability on the basis of the failure to 
warn. And - though we may have trouble with the theory of the 
case - can we quarrel much with the result? Should not this type of 
injury be the responsibility of the proprietor? Perhaps he might be 
more satisfied calling it strict liability, and the fact that it can be 
avoided with some sort of "warning" may present practical problems, 
but an insurance policy to cover liability in such situations as a risk 
of doing business does not seem an unhappy result. This case could 
have far-reaching effects if the Court chose to apply its reasoning 
broadly in other situations of injury to business invitees. 
§3.5. The notice statutes: Technical requirements. In a well-
reasoned opinion by Justice Lummus, the Supreme Judicial Court 
clarified a possible misinterpretation of a previous case in regard to 
the technical requirements under the notice statutes. In Murphy v. 
Boston 6' Maine Railroad 1 the defendant had received a directed 
verdict in the trial court on the grounds of insufficiency of the notice 
required under G.L., c. 84, §18. The notice, as all Massachusetts 
lawyers know, is a prerequisite to suit against a defendant for negli-
gence in maintaining a public way. Plaintiff was injured in a fall on 
the railroad tracks while crossing High Street in Medford. Under the 
statute the plaintiff is required to give notice within thirty days of the 
"cause of the injury." The only statement of cause in the notice was 
as follows: "As I was crossing first set of tracks, I caught my foot in 
some manner. I fell forward landing on both knees ... I have 
been over this crossing many times and am very familiar with it. It 
was in the same condition as it always has been as far as I can tell. I 
have not any fault to find with its condition. I did catch my heel in 
the rail somehow." 2 
The lower court held the notice defective in not stating the exist-
ence of any defective condition for which the railroad was responsi-
ble. In fact, the defendant argued that the notice indicated there was 
no defect of any kind. In its holding the lower court was relying on 
dicta in Pecorelli v. Worcester3 to the effect that the notice must con-
tain a statement of an "actionable defect." 
§3.5. 1332 Mass. 83. 123 N.E.2d 378 (1954). 
2332 Mass. at 84. 123 N.E.2d at 379. 
3307 Mass. 425. 30 N.E.2d 230 (1940). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court specifically rejected the language of 
the Pecorelli case and held that the notice was sufficient in that it 
stated the "cause" of her fall, i.e., catching her heel in the rail "some-
how." The Court asserted that it was unnecessary either to identify the 
cause of the fall as one for which an action would lie, or to make a 
claim or threat of action. 
The finding of the Court seems consistent with its assertion of the 
purpose of these statutes, the giving of notice to a defendant to enable 
it to investigate the occurrence and to determine whether it is liable. 
The notice was not such as to mislead the defendant in its investiga-
tion as was the notice in the Pecorelli case.4 
§3.6. The notice statutes: Snow, ice, and ice cubes - A remedial 
statute. The General Court in 1955 passed much-needed remedial 
legislation in regard to the statutory thirty·day notice requirement 
where injury is due to a defect in premises or adjoining ways "when 
caused by or consisting in part of snow and ice . . ." 1 The new 
amendment limits the notice requirement to cases where the snow or 
ice results from "rain or snow and weather conditions." 
The amendment was occasioned by two highly questionable, and 
certainly controversial,2 decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court un-
der the former statute. The first was DePrizio v. Woolworth CO.,3 
where the plaintiff slipped and was injured on snow tracked into 
defendant's store by customers. No notice was given under the stat· 
ute. A jury found for the plaintiff on the issue of the defendant's 
negligence. The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court on 
the question of a requirement of notice. The Court agreed a finding 
of negligence was warranted, but in a split decision entered a verdict 
for the defendant because of lack of notice. The Court found that 
the notice statute applied to "all snow and ice made the basis of the 
action, whether inside or outside the building and whether of nat· 
ural or artificial origin." 4 
The precipitating decision did not come, however, until 1952 in 
Smith v. Hiatt. 5 The facts of the case were almost like something 
out of a law professor's dream. The plaintiff was a practical nurse 
working in the defendant's home. She sustained an injury in the 
defendant's kitchen due to slipping and falling on an ice cube from 
the refrigerator. Again no notice was given and again the Court or· 
dered a verdict for the defendant on the grounds of this failure. 
4 In Pecorelli v. Worcester, note 3 supra, the notice identified the cause of injury 
as an unusual accumulation of snow and ice. At the trial the plaintiff attempted 
to prove that the injury was caused by the fact that the curbstone was higher than 
the abutting sidewalk. 
§3.6. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 505, amending C.L., c. 84, §21. 
2 See Notes, 15 B.U.L. Rev. 870 (1935), 33 id. 252 (1953). 
3291 Mass. 143, 196 N.E. 910 (1935). 
4291 Mass. at 147, 196 N.E. at 912. 
5 329 Mass. 488, 109 N.E.2d 133 (1952). 
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The Court cited the above-quoted language from the Woolworth case 
as controlling: that notice was required even though the injury was 
sustained within the building and was due to ice of an artificial origin. 
The remedial statute passed in 1955 would affect a change in the 
Smith-type case, since no notice would be required where the ice 
was of entirely artificial origin. The statute does not affect the Wool-
worth-type case, since the snow in that case was of a natural origin, 
being tracked inside by customers. 
It should be noted that the original bill 6 submitted on this matter 
would have eliminated the notice requirement in both cases since it 
would take all cases out of the statute where injury was received on 
the premises rather than outside, whether caused by natural or artifi-
cial snow or ice. The General Court evidently did not agree with the 
rationale of the bill, that where injury is received inside the premises 
the occupier usually has actual notice of the injury and thus a statu-
tory notice is generally unnecessary. The legislature did, however, 
feel that the statute should not cover injuries due to purely artificial 
snow or ice, and so at least this aspect of a still incongruous situation 
is rectified. 
§3.7. The theory of the plaintiff's case: Facts and inferences. A 
number of cases were considered by the Supreme Judicial Court this 
SURVEY year which may be grouped together for examination on the 
basis of the fact that in each the plaintiff was attempting to get to 
the jury on the issue of the interpretation of the defendant's conduct, 
the basic facts of the conduct not actually being in controversy. In the 
cases discussed in the following three sections, there were various 
theories being offered by the plaintiffs, but they all resolve down to 
this issue. As Charles P. Curtis, Jr., puts it in his latest book, It's Your 
Law: 
The trial courts are more usually concerned with conflicting 
characterizations of the facts than with the facts themselves. 
Truth is only a part of justice . . . 
Two characterizations or versions of the same facts are compet-
ing for acceptance by the trial court. They are oral claims which 
are put in the form of characterizations or versions of what hap-
pened. These versions of fact, much more than the facts them-
selves, are what the judicial process is dealing with.1 
The first of these cases was Flynn v. Hurley,2 in which the defendant 
fell asleep at the wheel of his automobile, hit a pole, and injured 
plaintiff, a guest occupant. The Court there held, in a split deci-
sion and overruling a previous decision,s that with no other evidence 
6 House No. 845 (1955). 
Ji3.7. 1 It's Your Law 85 (1954). 
2332 Mass. 182, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 185, 124 N.E.2d 810. 
3 Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480, 169 N.E. 412 (1929). 
\ 
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this was not enough to get to a jury on the issue of gross negligence. 
The plaintiff offered as evidence on the point only the fact that defend-
ant had been asleep for "a considerable length of time." The Court 
rejected this, saying, "the test . . . is not the length of time that a 
person at the wheel has been asleep but whether he fell into that 
condition in circumstances where he might have taken steps to avoid 
it." 4 
Every year, the Supreme Judicial Court reviews a number of cases 
where plaintiffs have sued proprietors for injuries due to falls on for-
eign substances. During the 1955 SURVEY year, the Court affirmed 
verdicts for plaintiffs in two cases worthy of examination. In Hast-
ings v. Boston & Maine Railroad/' the Court upheld a $22,000 ver-
dict for a plaintiff who slipped descending stairs because of "a greasy 
. substance four or five inches in diameter on one of the steps." 6 The 
substance was covered with dirt. The steps were dirty with rubbish, 
debris, cigarette and candy bar papers. Defendant excepted to the 
admission of the evidence of a witness in regard to the appearance of 
the grease a few minutes after the accident. The Supreme Court 
overruled the exception and said that an inference could be drawn 
that the condition was the same at the time of the fall. The Court 
affirmed the verdict saying the "condition of the grease as shown by 
the evidence" warranted the finding. It is difficult to distinguish the 
case from the many in which the Court has said the mere fact that the 
foreign substance is "dirty" is not enough to indicate it was there 
long enough to be discovered and removed.7 It may be that the case 
turns on the evidence that the stairs were in a generally unclean condi-
tion, i.e., the presence of rubbish, debris, cigarette and candy bar 
papers, indicated they had not been cleaned in some time. The 
Court, as shown in the quoted holding, does not stress this factor, 
however. 
In the second case, Di Noto v. Gilchrist Co.,s the plaintiff also 
slipped going downstairs. Plaintiff claimed she slipped on a wet and 
4 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 189, 124 N.E.2d at 813. 
I) 332 Mass. 42, 123 N.E.2d 211 (1954). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Both parties did an excellent job of collecting in their briefs the decided cases 
on both sides of the issue. The Court cited as· controlling a line of cases some of 
which are cited on both sides of the case, by the parties. For cases on the defendant's 
side, see Kelleher v. Dini's, Inc., 331 Mass. 217, 118 N.E.2d 77 (1954); Uchman v. 
Polish National Home, Inc., 330 Mass. 563, 116 N.E.2d 145 (1953) (here a patron 
actually slipped on a banana peel in a barroom, thus proving once again that a 
law professor's hypothetical cases really do come true); Foley v. Hotel Touraine Co., 
326 Mass. 742, 96 N.E.2d 698 (1951); DiAngelo v. United Markets, Inc., 319 Mass. 
143, 64 N.E.2d 619 (1946). For plaintiff, see Scaccia v. Boston Elevated Ry., 317 
Mass. 245, 57 N.E.2d 761 (1944); Berube v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 315 Mass. 
89, 51 N.E.2d 777 (1943); Manell v. Checker Taxi Co., 284 Mass. 151, 187 N.E. 224 
(1933); Tack v. Ruffo, 263 Mass. 487, 161 N.E. 587 (1928); Anjou v. Boston Elevated 
Ry., 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 (1911). 
S 332 Mass. 391, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 283, 125 N.E.2d 239. 
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worn step. She testified that the "edge of the step was an inch worn 
at least." It was a slab of terrazzo which a defendant's witness claimed 
contained a large percentage of abrasive non-slip material and at the 
outer edge 3~ inches of the step contained a greater portion than 
the rest of the step. The plaintiff made no claim that the step had 
any foreign substance or wax on it and the Court held her bound by 
this. 
However, in a split decision the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a 
refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant, asserting: 
The jury could find that the spot where she slipped was worn 
down at the edge at least an inch, that it was not in a reasonably 
safe condition, and that considering the material in which the 
wear occurred and its extent the defendant ought reasonably to 
have discovered it. Worn conditions in terrazzo or marble stairs 
either at the edge or next to the rising have been held to present 
a question of fact as to the negligence of the one in control of the 
stairway.9 [Emphasis supplied.] 
The Court did not cite any holdings on this point, however, and 
we are left to speculate as to the actual rationale of the decision. Is 
it that terrazzo and marble are known to be slippery when wet unless 
the abrasive is sufficient to eliminate this? If so, the verdict may be 
warranted either because the jury could find (1) the abrasive sub-
stance was not sufficient in the terrazzo to prevent its becoming slip-
pery when wet, or (2) the worn condition cut down the abrasiveness 
to the point where it was unreasonably slippery when wet. Actually, 
it is very difficult to reconcile the Court's treatment of these cases 
with some past decisions. As noted above in regard to the Hastings 
case, parties are able to cite many decisions on either side of most of 
these cases, and are even citing the same cases on both sides.10 The 
most important factor in each case, no matter what the language, is 
the action of the lower court. The Supreme Judicial Court in most 
cases will sustain the lower court action. 
§3.8. The theory of the plaintiff's case: Res ipsa loquitur and en-
terprise liability. In another particularly interesting decision during 
the SURVEY year, The Lobster Pot of Lowell, Inc. v. City of Lowell,1 
the plaintiff sued the city of Lowell for negligence in allowing the 
sewer abutting plaintiff's restaurant to overflow into the restaurant 
property. The plaintiff's premises were not attached to the sewer 
system. On six or seven occasions between 1935 and 1951, the pro-
prietor of the restaurant complained to the city about overflows and 
each time the city would come out and flush the sewer and drain in 
front of the restaurant and in the alleyway at the side of the restau-
9 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 284. 125 N.E.2d at 241. 
10 See note 7 supra. 
§3.8. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769. 127 N.E.2d 659. 
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rant and it would be corrected. In 1951, the sewer again overflowed, 
this time doing damage to the restaurant's downstairs dining room. 
The sewer department cleaned the drain connecting the sewer on the 
alleyway with the sewer on the street in front of the restaurant and 
the flow of water was stopped. 
The plaintiff sued for damages, relying on the fact that the city 
had made no periodic inspections of sewer lines during the two and 
one-half years from the last overflow complained of to this occasion.2 
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed, asserting: 
It appears, in the present case, that the damage to the plaintiff's 
property was caused by some stoppage on the drain connecting 
the sewer in the alleyway with that [in front of the restaurant]. 
There was no evidence of the condition of this drain or of the 
material obstructing it. Although the city had the duty of using 
reasonable care to keep its sewers free from obstructions (Bates v. 
Westborough, 151 Mass. 174, 182) in the absence of evidence as 
to the nature of the obstruction it could not be found to have 
failed in its duty. Whether it was something which should have 
been anticipated or which periodic inspection would have dis-
closed is left to conjecture.s 
The instant case goes along with a line of cases involving damage 
due to breaks in gas lines4 and a 1931 case involving water lines5 
which, though not cited by the Court, arrive at the same conclusion. 
The ultimate result of this case is an almost insurmountable burden 
on plaintiffs. The Court here admits that the city makes no peri-
odic inspection of its entire sewer system. And yet, when a stoppage 
occurs, the plaintiff must prove the "nature of the obstruction." Even 
then, it would seem that the plaintiff would have to go on to connect 
the obstruction logically to some negligence of the city - to connect 
it at least with the fact that periodic inspection would have prevented 
the obstruction from building up to a point where it overflowed. 
Since the sewer system is under the exclusive control of the city it is 
difficult to imagine how the plaintiff could obtain evidence, let alone 
sustain the burden of proof, on the defendant's negligence. 
In a number of other jurisdictions the courts have imposed an af-
firmative burden on municipalities to inspect their sewer systems pe-
riodically.6 The Massachusetts Court in the instant case does not say 
2 Plaintiff's Brief, p. 7. 
S 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 770-771, 127 N.E.2d at 660. 
4 Musolino LoConte Co. v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 330 Mass. 161, 112 N.E.2d 
250 (1953); Black v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 325 Mass. 505, 91 N.E.2d 218 
(1950). 
5 Goldman v. City of Boston, 274 Mass. 329, 174 N.E. 686 (1931). 
6 District of Columbia v. Gray, 6 App. D.C. 314 (1895); Blood v. Bangor, 66 Me. 
154 (1877); Rowe v. Portsmouth, 56 N.H. 291, 22 Am. Rep. 464 (1876); Barton v. City 
of Syracuse, 36 N.Y. 54 (1867). 
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there is no such duty, but it does not say there is.7 It seemingly does 
not feel it necessary to indicate any duty where the plaintiff has 
proved no damage directly resulting from this failure. Again, if there 
is a duty to inspect, and certainly there ought to be, should the munic-
ipality be able to avoid liability by having the burden of proof of a 
specific causal connection placed on the person damaged? 
The Court has rejected res ipsa loquitur as a means by which plain-
tiffs could get to the jury in these cases. In recent years some jurisdic-
tions have used the res ipsa doctrine to thrust on defendants the bur-
den of proving what did cause the injury in cases where all the facts 
are in the control of the defendants, even though the classic require-
ment of "exclusive control" is not met.S Such a procedural mecha-
nism might be suggested for use in cases of this type. Also, even if we 
assume that neither can actually prove what "caused" the damage 
in terms of legal responsibility, it can be argued that the city should 
pay on the theory that (1) they are deriving the benefit from the 
proprietary interest in the sewer system, and (2) they can spread 
these losses as a cost of doing business by taking out liability insurance. 
The latter theory of an enterprise liability is perhaps best expressed in 
Professor Albert Ehrenzweig's provocatively entitled book, Negli-
gence Without Fault.9 
§3.9. The theory of the plaintiff's case: Nuisance and negligence. 
In Ingram v. Tasca Hotel Corp.,! the plaintiff was injured when, as 
she walked along the public sidewalk, a swinging front door of the 
defendant's hotel "was violently opened out on the sidewalk" by "de-
parting guests." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the 
trial court, on leave reserved, entered a verdict for defendant. The 
plaintiff had alleged nuisance in her declaration and her appeal again 
alleged this grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court asserted that the 
decisive question in the case was whether or not maintaining "a swing-
ing door that swung out over a sidewalk of a public way in such a 
manner that it was likely to injure a pedestrian" 2 warranted a finding 
of nuisance. It found that it did, citing decisions from other states 
and two old Massachusetts decisions,3 which it asserted tend "strongly" 
in that direction. The decision points up very well how the theory 
of the case can control the outcome. The nebulous concept of "nui-
sance" was sufficient to sustain a verdict even though the hotel may be 
7 The Court does assert in the matter quoted at note 3 supra that there is a duty 
of reasonable care to keep its sewers free from obstructions. It is difficult to see how 
this could be done without periodic inspections. 
8 See Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, I Buffalo L. Rev. I (1951). For the 
leading case in this trend, see Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). 
9 Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault 55-63, 75·80 (1951). 
§3.9. 1332 Mass. 121, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1003, 123 N.E.2d 519. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1004, 123 N.E.2d at 520. 
3 Commonwealth v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234 (1871); Hyde v. Middlesex, 2 Gray 267 
(Mass. 1854). 
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required to have its doors swing out because of fire regulations, even 
though it may not have violated any statutes or municipal regulations 
in regard to the position of its front door, and even though the door 
was swung open "violently" by departing guests. The question might 
be raised whether or not a door which swings in might not also be a 
nuisance in regard to persons inside the premises who also might be 
struck passing by it. Perhaps property owners are left in this case 
with a requirement that they install revolving doors, or place all doors 
in recessed places where persons cannot just "walk by" and be struck 
by some other person coming through them. 
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